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Effects of Weapons on Guilt Judgments and Sentencing
Recommendations for Criminals
Richard A. Dienstbier, Scott C. Roesch, Ayumi Mizumoto, S. H. Hemenover,
Roger C. Lott, and Gustavo Carlo
Department of Psycholog y
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

In Study 1, we explored whether guns presented for target shooting would lead subjects to assign
longer prison sentences for crimes unrelated to the guns. Weapon-condition subjects recommended longer sentences than did control subjects, who had experienced equally energizing
sports activities. In Study 2, subjects acting as jurors watched a police officer’ s videotaped
deposition about a burglary arrest. Through the deposition, subjects in all conditions received
identical information about the gun. However, some subjects heard the description of the gun
taken from the burglar; some heard the description and saw the gun when it was placed on the
evidence table near them; and some heard the description and handled the gun. Burglary-tool
salience was manipulated similarly for another crime, but it had no effect. With increased
weapon salience, subjects attributed more guilt and assigned longer sentences, but there were
some differences between men and women, and we found unexpected positive relations between
sentence severity and empathy. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our
general finding that weapon salience elicits harsher criminal sentences.

Some years ago, several social psychologists investigated the
causal relations between weapons and aggressive behaviors.
Due in part to inconsistent findings in that literature, there has
been a recent resurgence in interest in the ª weapon effect.º
Our interests in the issue were sparked by those inconsistencies and by recent famous criminal cases in which weapons
were presented or discussed as evidence (e.g., California v.
Simpson). Specifically, we wondered about the effect of
weapon salience on the guilt and sentencing judgments that
judges and jurors make. As our Study 2 coincided with the
continuing national debate on the ban of assault weapons (the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1994), we used one of the
banned weapons as a stimulus in Study 2. The purposes of our
research were to address several theoretical questions and to
address the practical issue of whether the well-studied effects
of weapons on aggression would be observed when dependent
measures involved guilt attributions toward and sentencing of
criminals.
In their original study of the weapon effect, Berkowitz and
LePage (1967) demonstrated that the presence of a pistol and
Requests for reprints shoul d be sent to Richard A. Dienstbier, Department
of Psychology , University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588 –0308. E-mail:
rad@ unlinfo.unl.edu

a shotgun, in contrast to neutral objects such as a badminton
racket, influenced angered subjects to behave more aggressively toward an antagonist. That research was followed by
many successful conceptual replications (e.g., Berkowitz &
Frodi, 1977; Caprara, Renzi, Amolini, D’ Imperio, &
Travaglia, 1984; Frodi, 1975 ; Leyens, Cisneros, & Hossay,
1976) as well as some replication failures (e.g., A. H. Buss,
Booker, & E. Buss, 1972; Cahoon & Edmonds, 1984 , 1985 ;
Ellis, Weiner, & L. Miller, 1971; Halderman & Jackson, 1979 ;
Page & Scheidt, 1971) and even some actual reversals of the
weapon effect (e.g., Fischer, Kelm, & Rose, 1969).
Those mixed results prompted Carlson, Marcus-Newhall,
and N. Miller (1990) to perform a series of meta-analyses to
determine the parameters of the weapon effect. Carlson et al.
reviewed 10 articles that used weapons (and other studies
using different aggression-stimulating cues), several of which
presented multiple studies and most of which presented multiple conditions. Despite finding ª a nonsignificant, near-zero
average effect-sizeº (p. 626), Carlson et al. concluded that
aggression increases in the presence of weapons and attributed replication failures and reversals to evaluation apprehension and hypothesis aw areness.
Carlson et al. (1990) came to a series of conclusions about
weapon-effect parameters and limitations that have relevance
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for our hypotheses. Carlson et al. noted that aggression levels
were not affected by either the degree of weapon salience or
the extent of relevance of the aggressive cue (usually weapon)
to the recipient of the aggression. Carlson et al. also concluded
that prior anger is not necessary for a weapon effect, and they
noted that the status and power of target persons affected
cue-stimulated aggression in logical directions (e.g., with
lower aggression toward high-status individuals).
We expected that weapons would affect our written and
symbolic dependent measures of guilt and prison sentencing
as weapons had affected the physical aggression measures
that predominate in the weapon literature. That expectation
followed Berkowitz’ s (1993) theoretical perspective that aggression is ª some kind of behavior, either physical or symbolic, that is carried out with the intention to harm someoneº
(p. 11). Berkowitz emphasized that it is irrelevant whether
other goals are served by the aggressive act, such as protecting
society from a criminal; in fact, aggression is often cloaked
in a ª moral purposeº (p. 27). Support for the utility of that
perspectiveÐ that intended harm is necessary and sufficient
to define aggressionÐ comes from the demonstration that
many different physical and symbolic acts correlate with one
another and are similarly responsive to common aggressionrelevant manipulations even though those acts have little in
common except that they harm individuals (Carlson, MarcusNewhall, & N. Miller, 1989).
An important validity issue concerns whether responses on
our sentencing measures indicate real aggressive tendencies
when aggression is defined as behavior intended to harm
another. In Study 1, we asked people for their recommended
sentences for first-offense criminals guilty of a variety of
crimes. In Study 2, subjects assigned guilt to, and made
sentencing recommendations for, a single fictional criminal
arrested with a gun at a crime scene; however, no pretense
was made that sentences given in that role-play context would
affect a real individual.
Generally, our sentencing measures are like typical attitude measures, reflecting attitudes toward offenders. Socialpsychological research over several decades has suggested
that attitudes usually affect behavior. But, Carlson et al.
(1989) provided a more specific analysis comparing questionnaire measures of aggression with physical laboratory measures, noting high correlations when the two types were obtained in the same researchÐ that is, r(35) = .71, p < .0001.
Carlson et al. also noted that written measures of aggression
in general indicated larger effect sizes than behavioral measures did. As with the sentencing measures in our research, a
large subset of the written measures analyzed by Carlson et
al. included ª instances in which the victim is unaware of the
level of expressed aggressionº (p. 386). That subset of measures also corresponded with physical measures. With similar
analyses, Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982) reviewed a variety of studies showing that aggressive behavior in nonlaboratory settings corresponds with various attitude measures
and with aggressive physical responses in the laboratory.

This analysis therefore suggests meaningful positive relations among attitude measures of aggression, written measures obtained in laboratory settings, and behavioral measures
obtained inside and outside laboratories. Based on those
analyses, although we cannot be certain that responses to our
sentencing questionnaires would reflect real behaviors in the
voting booth or courtroom, substantial support exists for that
conclusion.

STUDY 1
Although we used the sentencing of criminals as a dependent
measure, Study 1 (unlike Study 2) was not designed to mimic
any aspects of a criminal trial. Instead, it allowed us to
determine that criminal-sentencing measures would be sensitive to a ª weapon manipulationº and to address some theoretical issues.
Our hypotheses relate to but do not consistently agree with
Carlson et al.’ s (1990) observations.
We hypothesized that handling weapons would stimulate
harsher sentences (in contrast to controls, who handled other
sports equipment), even (as suggested by Carlson et al., 1990 ;
Berkowitz, 1993 , p. 53) when the guns had no connection with
the crimes or criminals.
However, coinciding with Berkowitz’ s (1993, p. 83) view
that hunters may be less likely to attach aggressive meaning
to guns, we hypothesized that greater past use of guns would
reduce their salience and decrease the weapon effect.
Reflecting our belief that weapons stimulate severe sentencing as a result of cuing ideas about aggressionÐ rather
than, or in addition to, misattributing tension evoked by
weapons to a target personÐ we predicted an effect from a
weapon manipulation that was no more energizing than the
control condition. (For a similar perspective on aggressive
ª meaningº being elicited by cues like weapons, see Berkowitz, 1993 , pp. 70, 83.)
We hypothesized that anger should enhance the weapon
effect. This hypothesis simply follows from much of the early
research findings and does not contradict Carlson et al.’ s
(1990) conclusion that anger is not a necessary condition.
Finally, based on traditional conceptions of hostility and
empathy, we hypothesized that trait hostility would increase
sentencing and that trait empathy would reduce sentencing.

Method
Design and Overview
In Study 1, we used a 2 (Sex) × 2 (Anger vs. Non-Anger)
× 2 (Weapon vs. Sport) between-subjects factorial design with
same-sex groups of 4 subjects randomly assigned to the
conditions. Non-anger subjects participated without delay in
the weapon or sport condition; anger subjects were first
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delayed by a rude researcher for 15 min. Before departing,
subjects completed measures of mood, sentencing of first-offense criminals, hostility, and empathy as well as the postexperimental questionnaire.

Subjects
Students from an introductory psychology course volunteered for participation in a study on ª personality, attitudes,
and sports preferences.º After data from 4 suspicious subjects
were eliminated (2 each from the weapon and sport conditions, to be described), 74 men and 89 women comprised the
final sample.

Dependent Measures
Sentencing. For our main measure, subjects assigned
prison sentences for 12 first-offense crimes ranging from
drunk driving through drug offenses, vandalism, arson, robbery, rape, and manslaughter. For each crime, subjects chose
a specific sentencing option from a 14-point scale, with
sentences ranging from no prison time (1); through fine
midscale gradations such as 2 years (4), 3 years (5), and 5
years (6); to a death sentence (14). Despite the wide range of
crimes, Cronbach a s were .88 in Study 1 and .91 in Study 2,
suggesting substantial within-person consistency in the sentencing of hypothetical criminals on this general sentencing
measure.

Mood Adjective Checklist (MAC). The 21-item MAC
used in both studies was based on the 3-item-per-factor short
form developed by Nowlis and Green (1965). Cronbach a s
for these 3-item measures were satisfactory (.57 to .87).
Postexperimental questionnaire. Our postexperimental questionnaire was specific and detailed. For example,
weapon subjects were asked whether they were ª suspicious
that the guns you saw were here for some purpose other than
the purpose explained to you by the researcher.º Subjects
indicated the levels of their suspicions and when any suspicions were developed.
Independent Measures
Empathy. From a principal-components factor analysis
of all items on Davis’ s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index,
1

With punitiveness as a dependent measure , our anger manipulation did
not interact significantly with the weapon manipulation. However, these data
do not affirm that anger had no effect: Our manipulation checks suggeste d
only minimal and nonsignificant anger differences from our manipulation,
and differences in punitiveness between the weapon and sport conditions
were nonsignificantl y greater for angry subjects. Given the inconclusivenes s
of these findings, although we include anger as a dimension in the analyses
of our data, w e omit further discussion of the anger manipulation.
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Mehrabian and Epstein’ s (1972) Questionnaire Measure of
Emotional Empathy, and Hogan’ s (1969) Empathy Scale,
Weimer (1990) identified six factors. We based our measures
on Weimer’ s analysis.
Cronbach a s for the six factors in our research were .53
(Emotional Control; 5 items), .55 (Distress at Another’ s Condition; 5 items), .74 (Emotional Concern for Others; 5 items),
.76 (Fantasy Empathy; 5 items), .71 (Perspective Taking; 4
2
items), and .40 (Tolerance for Others; 5 items).

Hostility.

We used the Buss – Durkee (A. H. Buss &
Durkee, 1957 ) Hostility Inventory, but, as hostility was not a
moderator or mediator of any effects in either study, no results
are discussed.

Experience with and enjoyment of guns. Five items
on hunting experience, enjoyment of hunting, enjoyment of
hunting-related activities, target-shooting experience, and enjoyment of target shooting were created and combined into a
single gun familiarity measure (a = .90) that was given only
to the subjects exposed to guns.
Procedures
Upon arrival, the 4 same-sex subjects participating in each
session were seated in a central waiting room surrounded by
a suite of four smaller adjoining cubicles, each of which
contained a different piece of sport or game equipment. Our
cover story explained that we were studying how liking for
spectator and participant sports related to social attitudes and
personality. Thus, subjects were invited to look into each of
the cubicles, and we misinformed them that they would
eventually experience each of the cubicles. Tw o of the four
cubicles contained materials relevant to our manipulations:
The sport (control condition) cubicle contained equipment for
football, basketball, and racquet sports; the weapon-condition
cubicle contained fishing rods and two guns ª for outdoor
sports like fishing and hunting.º
The 2 nondelayed subjects were sent directly into the sport
and weapon cubicles, but the 2 subjects in the delayed (anger)
condition waited about 15 min before experiencing those
same conditions. When subjects entered the cubicles, they
watched videos that explained that the procedure of watching
sports on TV and handling sports equipment would equate
their recent sports experiences.

Sport condition. After the introduction, each subject
watched 3 min of Olympic gymnastics and, after being instructed to imagine being in the middle of an exciting football
play, handled the football for 1 min. The subject then watched
2.5 min of an exciting professional basketball ª slam-dunk
2

The Tolerance for Others scale was subsequentl y droppe d for low
reliability.
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contestº ; after receiving instructions to imagine participating
in this contest, the subject handled the basketball for 1 min.

Weapon condition. After the introduction, each subject watched a 3-min fishing program and then practiced
casting with the fishing rods for 1 min while imagining
catching fish. Then, a 1.5-min target-shooting sequence
showed a pistol being shot at a target in an indoor range. The
subject was then asked to handle (in sequence) a .22 rifle and
a Ruger Super Black Hawk .44 magnum pistol with an 8-in.
barrel, sighting down the barrels of each while simulating
target-shooting for 2 min.

sentences than did men (Ms = 57.3 and 53.7, respectively),
F(1, 155) = 3.53, p < .07.
To determine whether guns affected sentencing only when
crimes would have logically included weapons, we divided
the 12 crimes of the general sentencing measure into all
logical categories and noted that the effect of guns was
consistent across categories. Specifically, increased sentences
following exposure to weapons were statistically significant
for the nonviolent crimes but also for crimes committed with
guns. The effect approached significance for violent crimes
(p < .16) and for crimes without guns (p < .06).

Weapon Effects on Mood

Activities common to the sport and weapon
conditions. Following those activities, subjects were instructed by their videos to complete the mood and general
sentencing measures as well as the questionnaires about their
liking for the sports relevant to their cubicles. The sports
questionnaires were included to verify the cover story about
sport preferences and to obtain information from weapon
subjects about gun familiarity.
After completing those measures, subjects left their respective cubicles to complete the hostility, empathy, and
postexperimental questionnaires before being debriefed.

Results
Weapon Effects on Sentencing
As shown in Table 1, a 2 (Sex) × 2 (Anger vs. Non-Anger)
× 2 (Weapon vs. Sport) between-subjects analysis of variance
(ANOVA) showed that weapon subjects assigned significantly longer sentences than did sport subjects to first-offense
criminals. Although we had no hypotheses about sex differences, we noted that women gave nonsignificantly longer

A 2 (Sex) × 2 (Anger vs. Non-Anger) × 2 (Weapon vs.
Sport) multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) with the six mood
factors as dependent measures indicated a main effect for the
weapon condition on mood, F(7, 142) = 2.58, p < .02, with
univariate ANOVAs indicating that the presence of guns had
substantial effects on four of the six mood dimensions measured. Specifically, as indicated in Table 1, guns resulted in
significantly lower levels of ª surgencyº (ª carefree,º ª playful,º and ª wittyº items) and nonsignificantly lower vigor.
Guns stimulated nonsignificantly more anger and significantly more anxiety. However, as noted in the lower section
of Table 1, the increased anxiety from guns was entirely due
to women.
To assess our success in equating energy (as conceptualized
by Thayer, 1989 ) between the sport and weapon conditions,
we created an energization score by subtracting the score for
the mood of fatigue (based on ª drowsy,º ª sluggish,º and
ª tiredº items) from that for vigor (ª active,º ª energetic,º and
ª vigorousº items). As seen in Table 1, energization was similar
for the sport and weapon conditions; no other main or interaction effects approached meaningfulness or significance.

TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Significance for General Sentencing and Mood Measures of Study 1
Condition
Weapon
Measure
All Subjects
a
Sentencing
Energization (range –9 –9)
Surgenc y (range 4 –12)
Vigor (range 4 –12)
Anger (range 4 –12)
Anxiety (range 4 –12)
Women Only
Anxiety
Men Only
Anxiety
a

Sports

M

SD

b

M
c

SD

57.6
3.51
7.10
8.57
5.48
5.75

10.9
4.70
2.65
2.91
2.48
2.47

53.7
3.94
8.04
9.35
4.89
4.97

13.0
5.16
2.47
2.98
2.38
2.10

6.35

2.72

4.79

1.86

1.95

5.19

2.36

5.03
b

c

Possible range is from 12 to 168. 4.4 years. 3.4 years.

Significance

F(1, 155)
F(1, 154)
F(1, 151)
F(1, 154)
F(1, 153)
F(1, 151)

= 4.36, p < .01
= 1, ns
= 5.28, p < .03
= 2.82, p < .10
= 2.36, p < .13
= 4.61, p < .05

Interaction, F(1, 151) = 5.68, p < .02

EFFECTS OF WEAPONS ON SENTENCING

Assessments of Arousal Misattribution
To assess whether weapon-induced arousal might stimulate aggressiveness as reflected in harsh sentencingÐ either
directly or through misattribution of arousal to the criminal
sentencing activityÐ we assessed in detail the contributions
of the arousal-relevant mood states to sentencing. Multiple
regression equations were constructed to assess the weapon
effect on sentencing after first removing sex and the separate
and joint effects of energization and anxiety. Neither energization nor anxiety made a significant or substantial independent contribution to sentencing (e.g., when removed together, both b s were less than .05, ns). However, with sex,
anxiety, and energization effects removed separately or together, the independent contribution of the weapon condition
remained consistently significant (e.g., b = .18), t(154) = 2.24,
p < .03, after sex, anxiety, and energization effects were
removed.

Gun-Familiarity Effect
We examined the gun familiarity effect on sentencing
through a multiple regression procedure. The Gun Familiarity
score, obtained only for weapon subjects, was a negative
predictor of sentence length ( b = – .32), t(75) = 2.01, p < .05,
with the sex effect removed. That effect remained relatively
constant for subcategories of crimes such as crimes of violence and crimes against persons. However, gun familiarity
was more strongly related to sentencing by women, r(43) =
–.31, p < .04, than by men, r(36) = – .10, ns.

Empathy± Sentencing Relation
Contrary to our hypothesis, harsher sentences corresponded with higher scores on each of the empathy factors
previously described. That relation was significant for perspective taking ( b = .18), t(159) = 2.30, p < .02, with sex and
weapon effects removed.

Discussion
These results suggest that experimental exposure to guns
leads to harsh sentencing of criminals even when the guns are
described as being for target use and are dissociated from both
the crimes and the recipients of those sentences. This effect
occurred despite our contrasting weapons with a control condition that elicited an equivalent level of arousal. Consistent
with our hypothesis, long-term familiarity with weapons reduced the effect of guns on harsh sentencing, especially for
women; contrary to our hypothesis, however, the perspectivetaking component of empathy correlated positively with sentence lengths.
The pattern of findings on the mood measures suggests that
guns were associated with an overall increase in negative
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affectivity and an overall decrease in positive affectivity but
with guns eliciting anxiety only in women. However, the
finding that the weapon effect on sentencing remained after
arousal-related mood effects were removed suggests that this
effect cannot be attributed to arousal transfer or misattribution
effects.

STUDY 2
Finding an effect of weapons that were dissociated from any
criminal activity on criminal sentencing led us to hypothesize
effects on guilt attributions and on sentencing of a specific
criminal when the salience of that criminal’ s gun was manipulated. Subjects in all three salience conditions heard an identical description of the gun and of the conditions of its being
discovered by the arresting police officer. Thus, we manipulated weapon salience while maintaining equal information
about the gun in all three experimental conditions.
Although our expectation of weapon salience effects opposes Carlson et al.’ s (1990) conclusions, these effects are
consistent with the usual psychological emphasis (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993 , p. 222) that stimuli that prime responses will not
necessarily affect all individuals, so that more salient stimuli
will have more effect. We hypothesized such an effect based
on our assumption that the automatic assault weapon used in
Study 2 would be very stimulating when held but less so when
only described.
However, because of important procedural differences
between Studies 1 and 2, we anticipated that our general
measures of sentencing (of all criminals) and of mood would
be less affected by our manipulations in Study 2 than they
were in Study 1. That is, in Study 1, two guns were handled
extensively (and fantasized about) in the weapon condition,
but guns were never mentioned in the control condition;
further, the anger manipulation appeared (albeit nonsignificantly) to enhance those between-conditions effects in Study
1. By contrast, in Study 2, between-conditions weapon salience differences were far less with all subjects exposed to
weapons (through extensive description, through description
plus sight, or through description plus handling); no anger
manipulation was introduced that could enhance the weapon
effects.
On the other hand, Study 2 subjects made guilt and sentencing judgments of the burglar who carried the gun. With
that direct association of the weapon with the burglar, we
expected the specific sentencing measure to be highly responsive to the weapon salience manipulation (as suggested by
Berkowitz, 1993, p. 76).
Although we endeavored to present the burglar’ s weapon
in a manner that would resemble the presentation of such
evidence in a trial, the research itself makes no pretense of
resembling a real trial. That is, our subjects heard only the
police officer’ s deposition rather than a complete trial, they
did not interact with one another, and we asked them to make
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sentencing recommendations in addition to decisions about
guilt or innocence.
Our primary hypothesis for Study 2 was that greater salience of a crime-relevant weapon would lead to longer recommended sentences for the weapon-carrying criminal. As our
measures of guilt were less sensitive, either-or measures, and
as we continued to be interested in issues of sentencing, we
considered the guilt measures to be secondary. We also hypothesized that our weapon salience manipulation would lead
to between-conditions differences in mood, general sentencing, and perspective taking that would replicate those found
in Study 1.

Method
Design and Overview
Tw o different crimes were presented to groups of 4 to 10
subjects acting as jurors. One crime was a burglary of a gas
station; the other was a burglary of a department store (hereafter, store). There were two versions of each crime, and,
whether the gas-station or the store crime was presented first,
the first crime was always associated with burglary tools
(hereafter, tools) and the second with the gun. The tools of the
first crime and the gun of the second were presented at one of
three salience levels to subjects. After each crime, mood,
guilt, and sentence recommendations for the criminal were
3
assessed.

Subjects
Introductory psychology students volunteered to fulfill a
research requirement. After data from 1 suspicious subject (in
the weapon-pass condition) and 2 subjects who did not understand the deposition were eliminated, 68 men and 63
women comprised the final sample.

Materials and Questionnaires
Gun. A disarmed Tech-9 automatic machine pistol obtained from a local police department served as the weapon.
This large gun was black and had a 15-bullet clip and a heat
shield over the barrel. It belongs to the class of automatic
assault weapons that were banned in the Omnibus Crime
Control Act of 1994.
3

The tool versions of the two crimes were created to assess the alternative
hypothesis that the salience of any substantial physical evidence would affect
sentencing. Tool versions were created by substituting the tool descriptions
for the gun description in the depositions and by substituting the actual tools
for the gun in the pass and show conditions. No weapon was involved in the
tool versions. Together, the hammer, the screwdriver, and the glass cutter
approximate d the bulk of the weapon. The 2 (Sex) × 3 (Tool Salience)
between-subjec ts ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.0) on guilt or punitiveness . Thus, descriptions of procedure s
and analyses of the tool crime are kept to a minimum here.

Videotaped depositions. The tool and gun versions of
each gas-station and store crime were described in the videotaped 20-min depositions given by a real police officer
undergoing questioning by a prosecutor (Lott, who had professional experience as a prosecutor). A ª defense attorneyº
was present but played a minor role.
In the gas-station deposition, police apprehended the lone
burglar in the gas station at night. A large bag of coins stolen
from the vending machine was found with the burglar and was
shown in the video. In the gun version of the crime, the gun
was found on the burglar when the burglar was searched; the
gun was removed from the burglar’ s belt by the police officer
(but no burglary tools were mentioned). The gun or the tools
were described at length on the videos, but neither appeared
on camera.
In the store deposition, in response to a silent alarm,
police discove red a pickup truck containing stolen electrical appliances. The burglar ran, but he fell and w as apprehended. In the gun version of the crime, as in the gun
version of the gas-station crime, the gun was found tucked
in the belt of the burglar, but it had never been draw n or
used by the burglar. As before, the gun or the tools w ere
described at length but w ere not show n on camera. One of
the stolen items, a boxed cordless telephone, w as described
and show n on c amera.
Qu estionnaires. Our key dependent measures asked
subjects to indicate ª if on the real jury, how w ould you vote
on the w eapon violation chargeº (gun crime only) and ª on
the burglary chargeº ; in eac h case, the choices were simply
gui lty and no t guilty. After each guilt question, subje cts
indicated their degree of certainty of guilt on a 4-point
scale . The sentencing measure asked subjects to assume the
defendant to be guilty on both the w eapon charge (gun
crime only), and the burglary charge. The sentencing options w ere as presented on the general sentencing measure
described for Study 1. The questionnaires for empathy,
hostility, ge neral sentencing, mood, and gun familiarity
were as described in Study 1, w ith the postexperimental
que stionnaire tailored to fit Study 2.

Procedures
Subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to
examine how people on juries make decisions. They were
randomly assigned to one of the three rooms, where they
watched the first videotaped deposition, which was identical
in all three conditions. The gas-station and store crimes were
each presented first, as the tool crime, for half of the sessions.
When mentioned on the video of the police officer’ s deposition, a bank bag full of coins (gas station) or a cordless phone
(store) was passed to subjects, who in turn passed it from
ª juror to juror.º Crime-scene photographs were also mentioned, but those were never shown to the subjects. These
procedures were used to familiarize subjects with passing
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TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations for the Guilt and Specific Sentencing Measures of Study 2 as a Function of Weapon Salience
Weapon Salience Condition
Pass
Measure

M

All Subjects
Guilt (range 2 – 4)
Sentence
Women Only
Sentence
Men Only
Sentence
a

b

Show
SD

Describe

M

SD

M

SD

3.88
a
6.60

0.33
2.33

3.87
b
6.38

0.34
2.09

3.70
c
5.47

0.46
1.87

7.30

2.16

5.90

1.71

5.40

2.26

6.00

2.34

6.90

2.36

5.50

1.54

Significance

F(2, 126) = 3.15, p < .05
F(2, 124) = 7.99, p < .001
Interaction, F(2, 124) = 5.02, p < .01

c

6.2 years. 5.8 years. 3.9 years.

ª exhibitsº from person to person but also to establish that
sometimes items mentioned would be passed and sometimes
they would not. Thus, subjects were exposed to evidence
presentation precedents designed to prepare them to experience without suspicion any of the three different levels of
presentation of tools and (later) gun.
After the first deposition concerning the tool crime ended,
subjects completed the dependent measures and were individually reassigned randomly to one of the three rooms, where
they were exposed to the second (gun) crime.
As with the tool condition, the subjects in one of the three
rooms were exposed to only the detailed verbal description of
the Tech-9 machine pistol given on the video (describe condition). Those in another room heard the gun description and
were simultaneously shown the gun by the experimenter; the
gun was then placed on the ª evidence tableº (show condition),
several feet in front of the subjects. The final third of the
subjects heard the video description and simultaneously were
handed the gun by the experimenter; subjects passed the gun
ª as an exhibitº from juror to juror (pass condition). In the
show condition, and in the pass condition after subjects finished handling the gun, the gun was placed on the evidence
table, where it remained in view throughout the remaining 7
min of the deposition. When the deposition ended and before
subjects were given the dependent measures, all of the evidence on the table was removed. Subjects did not verbally
interact during these procedures.
Subsequently, subjects completed the mood inventory and
the guilt and punishment recommendations for the gun-carrying burglar. Finally, they completed the measures of general
sentencing, empathy, and hostility and the postexperimental
questionnaire, and they were debriefed.

Results
Weapon Salience Effects on Guilt and
Sentencing
There were no effects for burglary location (i.e., store vs.
gas station), so these data were combined. The guilt measures

for the weapon and burglary charges were combined to increase power (neither was significant alone). We examined
the combined measure with a 2 (Sex) × 3 (Weapon Salience)
ANOVA. As indicated in Table 2, guilt differed significantly
between weapon salience conditions, with the least guilt
4
attributed when the gun was merely described.
We examined the specific sentencing of the burglar similarly, but with a 2 (Sex) × 3 (Weapon Salience) analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) with the general sentencing measure
5
used as a covariate. As noted in Table 2, a significant main
effect for weapon salience was found, with longer sentences
given with increased contact with the gun.
To explicate that finding, orthogonal contrasts were performed on the adjusted specific sentencing measure. Longer
sentences resulted from the weapon-pass condition than from
the describe condition, F(1, 127) = 13.91, p < .001; similarly,
sentences were longer following the show condition than
following the describe condition, F(1, 127) = 3.82, p < .05.
However, as shown in Table 2, the gun effect on sentencing
was due mainly to the weapon having a greater effect on
women than on men, as reflected in a significant Sex ×
Weapon Salience interaction. Orthogonal contrasts showed
that women in the pass condition gave significantly longer
sentences than women in both the show, F(1, 41) = 12.25, p
< .002, and describe, F(1, 42) = 20.43 , p < .001, conditions.
4

Guilt was score d either not guilty (1) or guilty (2), so that the summary
score for both charges could vary from 2 to 4. The high means for this measure
indicate that most subjects attribute d guilt on both charges. When level of
certainty was used as a multiplier of guilt, that measure was similarly
statistically significant between weapon salience conditions, but it is not
detailed here due to its redundanc y with the guilt measure .
5
There were no substantial or significant effects of w eapon salience on
the general sentencing measure, but wome n were significantly more punitive
than men on that measure, F(1, 125) = 10.33, p < .003. Thus, in the Study 2
analyses, we treated punitiveness score s as dispositional and used them as a
covariate to allow more powerful tests of weapon salience on specific
sentencing of the burglar who carried the weapon. However, w hen w e
subjected our data to a 2 (Sex) × 3 (Weapon Salience) ANOVA without
including general sentencing as a covariate, a significant main effect for the
weapon condition and a significant Sex × Weapon Condition interaction were
still found.
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Men in the show condition gave significantly longer sentences than men in the describe condition, F(1, 39) = 4.07, p
< .05.
Finally, as in Study 1, women gave longer sentences on
the general sentencing measure, F(1, 125) = 10.33 , p < .003,
and they tended to give longer prison sentences to this guncarrying burglar, as shown by a nearly significant main effect
for sex, F(1, 124) = 3.21, p < .08.

Weapon-Salience Effects on Mood
To assess effects on mood, a 2 (Sex) × 3 (Weapon Salience)
MANOVA was examined with the six mood factors as dependent measures. No main effects were evident, and there
were no substantial nonsignificant replications of the Study 1
mood effects of weapons.

Perspective-Taking and Gun-Familiarity
Effects on Sentencing
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed
with specific sentencing as the criterion. Three main-effect
vectorsÐ two dummy-coded weapon salience conditions plus
perspective takingÐ were entered at Step 1; the two two-way
interaction vectors were entered at Step 2. Perspective taking
interacted significantly with weapon salience. Analyses based
on Aiken and West’ s (1991) procedures revealed that increases in perspective taking led to increases in sentencing
only in the weapon-pass condition, t(48) = 3.76, p < .001, and
that perspective taking had no effect in either the show or
describe condition.
As noted in Study 1, women with lower Gun Familiarity
scores gave longer sentences, r(59) = –.28, p < .05. However,
for men, specific sentencing was positively related to gun
familiarity, r(51) = .30, p < .05.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
The weapon salience manipulations of Study 2 led to greater
numbers of guilty verdicts. Similarly, the Study 2 results
clearly show a weapon salience effect on sentencing achieved
without the induction of anger. Thus, although weapon salience clearly affected the measures directly relevant to the
gun-carrying burglar, the attenuated range of weapon salience
between conditions in Study 2 probably accounts for failing
to achieve effects similar to those of Study 1 on the general
sentencing and mood measures.

Theoretical Issues
An obvious possible explanation for the results of any study
that contrasts weapons with a no-weapon control is that

weapons may stimulate harsher sentencing or aggression
because weapon-stimulated arousal can be misattributed to
(or displaced toward) an appropriate target. Finding a weapon
effect in Study 1 (in which the two conditions were equally
energizing) and in Study 2 (in which no significant betweenconditions mood effects were noted) suggests a more cognitively based explanation for the weapon effect.
Thus, we are led toward Carlson et al.’ s (1990) position
that weapon effects may result from the activation of relevant
schemas. Our ideas about how such schema activation may
relate to sentencing are entirely post hoc and speculative, as
we anticipated neither the sex differences in sentencing nor
the positive relation between perspective taking and sentencing that was found in Study 1 and (somewhat) replicated in
Study 2. Bushman (1996) recently provided an interesting
framework for considering these results.
Bushman (1996) measured trait aggressiveness (with a
measure developed by A. H. Buss & Perry, 1992) and aggression anxiety (Feshbach & Singer, 1971; Feshbach, Stiles, &
Bitter, 1967) in male and female college students. Like our
subject population, his was drawn from a large Midwestern
university. Bushman noted that men from that population
were considerably higher (about 1 SD) in trait aggressiveness,
whereas women were higher (about .5 SD) in aggression-anxiety. (Significantly, one of the items in the aggression-anxiety
measure is ª picking up a loaded gun makes me nervous.º )
Following his initial findings of stronger associations between
aggressive terms by women and those high in trait aggressiveness, Bushman suggested that people differ in the degree to
which their ª cognitive associative networksº are like those of
the perpetrators of aggression or those afraid of being victimized by aggression. In follow-up research (also Bushman,
1996), he found that aggressive stimuli were rated as both
more aggressive and more frightening by women and by those
high in aggression-anxiety.
Following Bushman’ s (1996) work and Berkowitz’ s
(1993) similar observations that weapons are likely to evoke
responses associated with either ª fight or flightº (or both), we
suggest that the weapons in our two studies were likely to
evoke two types of schemas and/or fantasiesÐ those associated with security and power (e.g., Bushman’ s ª perpetrator
networksº ) and those associated with weapon insecurity and
threat (e.g., ª victim networksº ).
Although Bushman (1996) did not study weapons, his
findings with other aggression-evoking stimuli suggest that
women are more likely to experience insecurity/threat in the
context of weapons and that the aggressive quality of weapons
will also be more evident to women. Consistent with those
empirical observations, survey data presented by Berkowitz
(1993, pp. 240 – 241, 392 – 393) suggest that these hypothesized sex differences in response to weapons are realistic, with
far higher rates of women victimized by violence than perpetrating such offenses. And, according to Berkowitz (1993, pp.
48 – 49), both of these characteristicsÐ associated more
strongly with women, experiencing more aggressive meaning
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and more aggression anxietyÐ should stimulate aggressive
responses. Therefore, it follows that there should be a consistent relation for women between increased weapon salience
and increased aggression, as reflected in sentencing.
On the other hand, because men are more frequent users
of weapons and perpetrate far more violence than women, the
balance of schemas activated in men by guns may favor
greater security/power schemas and reduced insecurity/threat
schemas. Thus, the implications for men’ s responses (on
sentencing measures) to weapon salience are less predictable
than women’ s responses. In relation to these speculations,
remember that men assigned (nonsignificantly) shorter sentences when they had the opportunity to handle the gun in
Study 2 (pass condition) in contrast to their sentencing when
they could see the gun but not handle it (show condition).
Perhaps men feel less threatened when the gun is in their
hands. Findings that women were made anxious by the guns
(Study 1) and that the women lowest in gun familiarity (both
studies) gave longer sentences support these speculations that
schemas of insecurity/threat may mediate the positive relation
between guns and sentencing.
Like our findings of sex differences, our Study 1 finding
of perspective taking being associated with increased sentences for criminals surprised us, but Study 2 partially replicated those results. If people high in perspective taking actually do take the perspective of others, whose perspective
would lead to greater criminal sentences? As we did not
anticipate these results, our analysis is entirely post hoc.
In Study 2, the most obvious perspective to take was that
of the arresting police officer, who described the gun-associated crime on camera for 20 min (the burglar was never
shown). Further, the Tech-9 machine pistol used in Study 2
is an attention-focusing weapon, particularly when handled.
It seems likely that more sympathy for the police officer who
pursued a burglar armed with such a weapon would be evoked
in those highest in perspective taking, especially after handling that gun.

Applications
These findings have real-life implications. First, they suggest
that the salience of weapons that are presented as evidence in
trials may have effects on guilt assessments and sentencing
for criminals. That is, it appears that the balance between the
ª probative valueº and the ª prejudicial effectsº of such evidence (see, e.g., Lilly, 1978 ) is affected by weapon salience,
for our Study 2 results show that, even when information
about the gun was equivalent between conditions, its increased salience apparently had a prejudicial effect.
Second, these results suggest that women may be more
generally punitive than men toward criminals, but especially
when guns are present. Further, criminal-sentencing individuals or groups who are less familiar with guns are likely to be
maximally affected by the presence of weapons. Although our
findings suggest that women who are unfamiliar with guns
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advocate longer sentences, our results suggest that men will
probably also be affected by guns, but in uncertain ways.
Third, contrary to our initial hypothesis, individuals who
are higher in the perspective-taking component of empathy
are more likely to be affected by weapons, recommending
longer sentences. However, women’ s granting longer sentences to criminals generally and in the presence of weapons
is not due to higher perspective taking by women, for that
measure and sex of subject make independent contributions
to sentencing. These observations have relevance for jury
selection.
As these practical implications are considered, we must
consider the issue of discriminative validity. Remember that
the results with tool salience in Study 2 showed clearly that
sentencing would not be affected by salience manipulations
of just any important piece of evidence. However, the question remains whether guilt and sentencing differences might
be obtained from salience manipulations of other powerful
and emotion-evoking stimuli. Should the ª bloody gloveº be
passed from juror to juror? Berkowitz’ s (1993) perspective is
clearly that a great variety of stimuli and conditions may
evoke negative emotions and/or meanings that trigger aggressive responses. We agree and thus cannot argue here that
weapons are qualitatively unique. They seem, however, to be
unusually powerful and complex stimuli capable (as we have
argued) of eliciting meanings associated with both insecurity/threat and security/power.
As a postscript to these conclusions, in March 1996 the
U.S. Congress passed a resolution to eliminate the current ban
on automatic assault weapons. A sponsoring congressman
argued that his wife, home alone 5 days each week, should
have the right to defend herself, presumably with an automatic
assault gun. That resolution failed, but the issue subsequently
became a significant issue in many campaigns during the fall
elections of 1996 . Although the issue is far from being resolved, those who advocate the ready availability of weapons
have already won the day. Children living in our cities calmly
tell investigative reporters that they can purchase guns at will,
and they proudly display their weapons before television
cameras; gunshot injuries are treated by public health officials
as an epidemic. We may react with favor or disfavor to the
possibility that weapons handled by jurors and judges (as they
usually are, when offered in evidence) may have prejudicial
effects on guilt assessments and sentencing. But the conclusionÐ that only harm to society results when similar dispositions result from guns being frequently in the hands of adults
or childrenÐ seems inescapable.
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